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The Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (IUM) of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)
attributes a key role to Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU), and additional roles to Positive
Beliefs about Worry (PBW), Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), and Cognitive
Avoidance (CA), in the development and maintenance of worry, the core feature
of GAD. Despite the role of the IUM components in worry and GAD has been
considerably demonstrated, to date no studies have explicitly assessed whether and
how PBW, NPO, and CA might turn IU into worry and somatic anxiety. The current
studies sought to re-examine the IUM by assessing the relationships between the
model’s components on two different non-clinical samples made up of UK and Italian
undergraduate students. One-hundred and seventy UK undergraduates and 488 Italian
undergraduates completed measures assessing IU, worry, somatic anxiety, depression,
and refined measures of PBW, NPO, and CA. In each sample, two mediation models
were conducted in order to test whether PBW, NPO, and CA differentially mediate
the path from IU to worry and the path from IU to somatic anxiety. Secondly, it was
tested whether IU also moderates the mediations. Main findings showed that, in the UK
sample, only NPO mediated the path from IU to worry; as far as concern the path to
anxiety, none of the putative mediators was significant. Differently, in the Italian sample
PBW and NPO were mediators in the path from IU to worry, whereas only CA played
a mediational role in the path from IU to somatic anxiety. Lastly, IU was observed to
moderate only the association between NPO and worry, and only in the Italian sample.
Some important cross-cultural, conceptual, and methodological issues raised from main
results are discussed.
Keywords: intolerance of uncertainty, worry, somatic anxiety, mediation, moderation, analog samples
INTRODUCTION
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) can be defined as the “individual’s dispositional incapacity to
endure the aversive response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or sufficient
information, and sustained by the associated perception of uncertainty” (Carleton, 2016, p. 31);
individuals high in IU find situations that are uncertain threatening, upsetting, and undesirable,
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regardless of the actual probability of a negative event to occur
(Dugas et al., 1998). IU as a construct was originally developed by
the Laval team working on models and treatments of generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD) in the early nineties (Freeston et al.,
1994; Dugas et al., 1998). Among the systematically validated
explanatory models of GAD (for a complete review, refer to
Behar et al., 2009), the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model of GAD
(IUM) proposed by Dugas et al. (1998) originally asserted that
four factors contribute to the development and the maintenance
of worry, the core feature of GAD (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2013): IU, Positive Beliefs about Worry
(PBW), Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), and Cognitive
Avoidance (CA).
A robust body of research bolstered the evidence of IU,
the model’s main feature, as a cognitive vulnerability factor
for worry, as well as a maintaining factor for GAD (e.g.,
Ladouceur et al., 2000; Sexton et al., 2003; Koerner and Dugas,
2008). Negative beliefs about uncertainty usually interfere with
the individual’s ability to effectively deal with these situations
and promote the use of worry as a dysfunctional strategy
to cope with or prevent feared outcomes (Dugas et al.,
1998; Behar et al., 2009). PBW are distorted beliefs about
the usefulness of worry; false contingencies usually act as
both positive (e.g., worrying can sometimes produce effective
solutions) and negative (the non-occurrence of a feared event)
reinforcements maintaining the use of worry (Freeston et al.,
1994; Dugas et al., 1998). Indeed, individuals endorsing PBW
believe that worry is a positive personality feature (i.e., “being
a worrier means being thoughtful”), and that worrying is an
effective problem solving strategy, capable of preventing negative
situations to occur, avoiding unpleasant emotions associated
with negative events, and motivating to act in life (Freeston
et al., 1994). NPO refers to a negative attitude toward problems
and consists of a set of negative cognitive and emotional
reactions that are activated when a problem situation occurs.
It is associated with low levels of confidence about the ability
to solve problems successfully, low personal control over the
problem solving process, and pessimism about problem-solving
outcomes (D’Zurilla and Nezu, 1999, 2006). When facing a
problem situation, individuals with GAD usually do not focus
on a problem solving strategy and do not consider themselves
as effective problem solvers although they have an adequate
knowledge of problem solving skills (Dugas et al., 1995, 1997;
Robichaud and Dugas, 2005b; Koerner and Dugas, 2006). Lastly,
CA is a cognitive process endorsed to avoid and/or suppress
unwanted mental content, especially fearful mental images
inducing peripheral physiological activation (Borkovec et al.,
1993, 2004). CA includes a number of strategies (both automatic
and controlled) such as substituting threatening thoughts with
neutral or positive ones, transforming mental images into verbal-
linguistic thoughts, etc., and it is particularly relevant to GAD
(Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas and Koerner, 2005). Notably, since
avoidance impairs the emotional processing of fear (Foa and
Kozak, 1986), CA usually leads to the maintenance of high levels
of worry and anxiety (Dugas et al., 1998; Borkovec et al., 2004).
Importantly, the clinical efficacy of the IUM-based treatments
for GAD relative to wait-list control conditions (Dugas and
Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur et al., 2000; Dugas et al., 2003, 2010;
Dugas and Robichaud, 2007) has been supported in multiple
studies.
Despite the role of all components in worry and GAD has
been considerably demonstrated (e.g., Freeston et al., 1994;
Borkovec and Roemer, 1995; Dugas et al., 1997, 2005; Ladouceur
et al., 1998, 1999; Robichaud et al., 2003; Buhr and Dugas,
2006; Koerner and Dugas, 2008), only a few studies were
conducted to shed light on the mechanisms through which
the IUM components act in determining worry and somatic
anxiety levels, i.e., the core features of GAD. For example,
Dugas et al. (2007) examined the associations between the
IUM components and different indicators of severity (diagnostic
severity, worry severity, and somatic symptom severity) in
patients with a primary diagnosis of GAD. Results from
correlations showed that IU and NPO were correlated with
all the three indicators of severity, whereas CA was related
with diagnostic and somatic symptom severity and PBW were
only associated with diagnostic severity. Furthermore, when
age, gender, and depressive symptoms were controlled, IU and
NPO maintained their positive correlations with worry, and IU
showed stronger correlations with worry severity rather than
with somatic symptom severity. Lastly, the conduction of linear
regressions highlighted that, partialling out the contribution of
IU, NPO was no longer a significant predictor of diagnostic
severity, worry severity, and somatic symptom severity, thus
suggesting that the role of IU in determining worry levels
is more relevant than the role played by the other variables
(Dugas et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the correlational nature of this
study does not allow understanding how the IUM components
interact in producing worry and somatic anxiety. A subsequent
attempt to examine a mediational path from IU to worry is
represented by a study by Koerner and Dugas (2008), who
tested the mediating role of appraisals of ambiguous situations
in the relationship between IU and worry through a vignette
task. University students high and low in IU were compared on
their appraisals of ambiguous, negative, and positive situations;
the former appraised all the situations they were presented
as more distressing than the latter (and this was particularly
true for ambiguous ones). Furthermore, the authors observed
that appraisals (cognitive bias) partially mediated the path
from IU to worry, and that worry partially mediated the
path from IU to appraisals. Despite results provided support
to the hypothesis of reciprocal relationships between worry
and cognitive processes, the other IUM components were
not taken into account in this study (Koerner and Dugas,
2008).
The Current Studies
In the last decade a fast growing interest in the role of IU as a
shared vulnerability factor for emotional disorders (e.g., Gentes
and Ruscio, 2011; Carleton, 2012) has been established, and
evidence supporting its involvement in several psychopathologies
has been reported (e.g., Holaway et al., 2006; Boelen and Reijntjes,
2009; van der Heiden et al., 2010; McEvoy and Mahoney, 2012;
Carleton et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2015; Banducci et al., 2016;
Jensen et al., 2016; Oglesby et al., 2016). Nonetheless, since the
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development of the IUM of GAD in 1998, the interest on IU as
a factor potentially specific to the development and maintenance
of worry and GAD has not diminished and the vulnerability role
played by IU in the development and maintenance of worry and
GAD has been repeatedly demonstrated (please refer to Koerner
and Dugas, 2008). For example, whilst all IUM components have
been shown to contribute to GAD as previously described, IU
has been identified as the strongest predictor of GAD in adults
(e.g., Dugas et al., 1997, 2007) as well as in adolescents (e.g.,
Laugesen et al., 2003); the experimental manipulation of IU has
been shown to induce changes in worry, with higher IU leading
to more worry (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2000; Koerner and Dugas,
2008); psychological interventions for GAD targeting increasing
tolerance of uncertainty have been demonstrated to reduce worry
(e.g., Dugas and Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur et al., 2000; Dugas
et al., 2003).
Despite such a shift in the conceptualization of IU (from
disorder-specific variable to transdiagnostic factor), we believe
that gaining a better understanding of the mechanisms through
which IU operates within specific conditions, leading to specific
kinds of phenomenology, might help clarifying how processes
may be specifically enacted in a way close to the expression
of symptoms. Therefore, the main aim of the present study
was to re-examine the original IUM model and, taking into
account the previously mentioned evidence supporting the
dominance and precedence of IU on worry/GAD (please refer
to Koerner and Dugas, 2008), we sought to further investigate
whether and how the other IUM components, i.e., PBW,
NPO, and CA, turn IU into worry and somatic anxiety.
We decided to pursue this aim by testing a refined IUM
model on two different non-clinical samples made up of UK
and Italian undergraduate students in light of the following
reasons.
First, research on analog samples could be appropriate
when advancing theories and models aimed at understanding
clinical phenomena, also because the phenotypic heterogeneity
characterizing clinical populations, as well as the existence of
comorbidity or treatment confounds, could represent a possible
obstacle to the investigation of the etiology of psychological
disorders (e.g., Abramowitz et al., 2014); furthermore, several
authors demonstrated the dimensional latent structure of worry
and anxiety symptoms in the population (e.g., Ruscio et al.,
2001; Olatunji et al., 2010). To note, a significant part of the
model’s development and subsequent testing has been conducted
on undergraduate samples (e.g., Freeston et al., 1994; Buhr and
Dugas, 2002; Carleton et al., 2007; Koerner and Dugas, 2008;
Helsen et al., 2013).
Second, we sought to preliminary investigate whether such a
refined IUM model could be applicable across cultures. Notably,
evaluating the existence of cross-cultural differences when
dealing with depression and anxiety is generally encouraged
(e.g., Malgady, 1996; Norton, 2005), since environmental factors
may vary across different cultures and cultural values might
play a crucial role in defining the way individuals interpret
and express their emotions and symptoms (Kirmayer, 2001).
Despite UK and Italy are relatively close European countries,
thus potentially sharing a number of similarities, they are
also characterized by some cultural differences which might
reasonably affect the way people of different cultures understand
and express uncertainty, IU, worry and anxiety. For example,
Italian people have been reported to be more prone to show
their emotions, even when negative, than British (Lecce and
Hughes, 2010). Even more interestingly, studies in the field of
economics and business sciences have classified Italy among
the “strong uncertainty avoidance cultures,” whereas the UK
has been included within the “weak uncertainty avoidance”
ones (De Mooij, 2000, 2003; Stremersch and Tellis, 2004;
Wennekers et al., 2007). In this field, “uncertainty avoidance”
refers to “the extent to which the members of a culture
feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations [. . .] “In
uncertainty avoidant cultures, risk taking is limited to known
risks (of which the probability is known), while in cultures low
in uncertainty avoidance, risk taking includes unknown risks (of
which the probability is not known)” (Stremersch and Tellis,
2004, p. 426). According to this, Italian people are likely to
be more conservative and more resistant to change than UK
individuals.
In light of the above-mentioned issues, we re-examined
the Laval model for GAD by conducting two studies testing
two different mediation models in two different undergraduate
samples (UK and Italian). In particular, we aimed at testing
whether PBW, NPO, and CA differentially mediate the path
from IU to worry and the path from IU to somatic anxiety. We
expected that:
(1) PBW, in light of their content specificity to worry (Freeston
et al., 1994), would mediate the relationship between IU and
worry and not between IU and somatic anxiety;
(2) NPO would mediate the paths from IU to both worry and
somatic anxiety. Indeed, findings by Dugas et al. (2007)
suggested that IU and NPO could be somewhat considered
equally strong predictors of worry and somatic anxiety
severity, and NPO has been suggested to be relevant across
anxiety symptoms (Fergus and Wu, 2011). The same was
expected also for CA, given previous evidence (Dugas et al.,
2007) and that it is usually endorsed to decrease somatic
activity (Borkovec et al., 2004).
(3) In light of evidence supporting that higher IU leads to
higher levels of worry (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2000; Koerner
and Dugas, 2008), we decided to assess whether IU also
moderates the mediations, i.e., whether the contribution of
PBW, NPO and CA not only stems from IU, but depends
on the level of IU.
Lastly, since no previous studies comparing the IUM
components across UK and Italian undergraduate samples were
conducted, we decided to exploratory investigate the presence
of any similarities and differences between groups without
advancing specific hypotheses. However, keeping in mind that
the British and the Italian cultures are claimed to differ in terms
of “uncertainty avoidance” (De Mooij, 2000, 2003; Stremersch
and Tellis, 2004; Wennekers et al., 2007), we speculated that
potential differences in the tested models could reasonably
emerge.
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STUDY 1
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
One hundred and seventy (86.5% females) UK undergraduate
students entered Study 1. Participants were all students attending
their 1st year aged between 18 and 30 years (M = 19.14;
SD = 1.50), 94.4% were Caucasian, and they were recruited at
the School of Psychology of the Newcastle University (United
Kingdom) during University courses; no incentives were offered
for participation. All participants were informed of the study’s
aims and gave their written informed consent before completing
the battery of questionnaires, which were administered in rotated
order to control for order effect. The research was approved
by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Medical Sciences
(Newcastle University).
Measures
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12 (IUS-12; Carleton et al.,
2007) is a 12-item self-report measure designed to assess
the individual’s tendency to find uncertainty upsetting and
distressing. Items on the IUS-12 were derived from the original
IUS (Freeston et al., 1994; Buhr and Dugas, 2002) and are highly
correlated with the original scale. Respondents are asked to
evaluate the extent to which each statement applies to them on
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not at all characteristic
of me” to 5 = “entirely characteristic of me.” The IUS-12 has
demonstrated excellent internal consistency, convergent, and
discriminant validity (Carleton et al., 2007; Khawaja and Yu,
2010; McEvoy and Mahoney, 2011). In line with the aims of the
present study, the Total score was used; internal consistency in
the current sample was excellent (α= 0.93).
The Why Worry-III (WW-III; Riley, 2010) is a 37-item revised
version of the Why Worry questionnaire (Freeston et al., 1994)
and the Why Worry-II (Gosselin et al., 2003) designed to assess
PBW. The WW-III requires respondents to think back to a
time when they have worried and rate the extent to which
they agree to each item on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
1= “disagree a lot” to 5= “agree a lot”. Seven different subscales,
each corresponding to seven PBW, were identified (Riley, 2010).
Given the goals of the present study, only the WW-III total score
was retained for the analyses. Similar to previous versions, also
the WW-III showed good psychometric properties (Riley, 2010);
in the current sample, Cronbach alpha for the total score was
excellent (α= 0.94).
The Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ;
Robichaud and Dugas, 2005a,b) is a 12-item questionnaire
assessing an individual’s approach to problems, including beliefs
that problems are threatening, low self-confidence about abilities
to solve problems, and pessimism about problem resolution
(Robichaud and Dugas, 2005a). Respondents are required to rate
the extent to which each statement corresponds to the way they
think about problems on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
1 = “not at all true of me” to 5 = “extremely true of me.”
The NPOQ has shown adequate internal consistency, test–retest
reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity (Robichaud and
Dugas, 2005a,b). The internal consistency observed in the present
sample was excellent (α= 0.96).
The Revised Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (R-CAQ;
Heary, 2011) The R-CAQ is a 35-item revised version of the
Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (Gosselin et al., 2002) and
it is a self-report measure designed to assess an individual’s
use of seven CA strategies. Participants have to rate the extent
to which each item is a typical mental action they perform in
response to certain thoughts on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 = “disagree a lot” to 5 = “agree a lot.” As for the WW-
III, given the aim of the present study, only the R-CAQ total
score was considered in the analyses. As for the original version,
the R-CAQ has demonstrated excellent psychometric properties
(Heary, 2011) and, in the current sample, internal consistency
was excellent (α= 0.94).
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al.,
1990) is a 16-item inventory designed to assess the tendency to
worry excessively and uncontrollably. It measures trait worry
by asking individuals to rate the extent to which each item
is typical of them on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
1 = “not at all typical of me” to 5 = “very typical of me.”
Internal consistency and test–retest reliability of the PSWQ
were good in non-clinical and clinical samples (Meyer et al.,
1990). Furthermore, convergent and divergent validity were good
(Molina and Borkovec, 1994). In the current sample, Cronbach
alpha emerged to be adequate (α= 0.78).
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales -21 (DASS-21; Lovibond
and Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item questionnaire organized into
three scales: Depression, referring to lack of incentive, low self-
esteem, and dysphoria; anxiety, assessing somatic and subjective
symptoms of anxiety, as well as acute responses of fear; and
stress, measuring irritability, impatience, tension, and persistent
arousal. Respondents have to indicate the extent to which each
statement applies to them over the previous week on a 4-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 = “did not apply to me at
all” to 3 = “applied to me very much, or most of the time.”
Good internal consistency, convergent and discriminant validity
on a large UK non-clinical sample were documented (Henry
and Crawford, 2005). Given the purposes of the present study,
only the Anxiety and Depression scales were considered in the
analyses; observed Cronbach alphas values in the current sample
were good (α= 0.85 and α= 0.89, respectively).
Statistical Analyses
Double data entry was performed to ensure data reliability. All
statistical analyses were performed using the software Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 22.
Prior to analyses, missing data (<1%) in questionnaires were
replaced with the participant’s mean score on the respective
measure. All measures were then screened for univariate and
multivariate normality, and distributions of all continuous
data were checked. Distributions on measures were considered
normal according to figures of skew and kurtosis. Generally,
scores were normally distributed with all items demonstrating
acceptable levels of skewness and kurtosis (≤|1| ). The DASS-
21 Anxiety and Depression scales evidenced significant skewness
and were subsequently transformed to a normal distribution
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by applying a log10 transformation. Internal consistency of
all measures was assessed by computing Cronbach alphas (α)
coefficients.
Intercorrelations among all study measures were performed
by calculating Pearson’s r or point-biserial coefficients. Mediation
models were then tested using a bootstrapping approach
through the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012, 2013).
PROCESS, in addition to testing traditional path coefficients,
provides direct, indirect and total effects, and bias corrected
and accelerated confidence intervals (CI). Mediation generally
occurs when 95% CI of the indirect effect estimated from the
bootstrap procedure excludes zero. Hayes (2013) demonstrated
that bootstrapping allows for more accurate and powerful
analyses than traditional mediation approaches (e.g., Baron
and Kenny, 1986); furthermore, differently from traditional
mediation approaches, modern approaches such as bootstrapping
do not require statistically significant direct effects to interpret
indirect effects (Hayes, 2013). Two mediation analyses were
performed. In each model, IU (IUS-12) was entered as the
independent variable; worry (PSWQ) and somatic anxiety
(DASS-21 Anxiety) were, in turn, entered as dependent variables;
three parallel mediators, i.e., PBW (WW-III), NPO (NPOQ),
and CA (R-CAQ), were entered simultaneously. Notably
depression, as measured by the DASS-21 Depression scale, was
entered as a covariate in each model in light of the strength
of the associations emerged with all the models’ variables
(please refer to Table 2). For each analysis, we used 5,000
bootstrap samples; 99% bias corrected CIs to evaluate the
significance of the conditional indirect effects were used in
light of the numerous comparisons being done in multiple
samples.
Furthermore, since PROCESS allows testing conditional
indirect effects of an independent variable, which means assessing
an independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable
through mediators, depending on a moderator (i.e., moderated
mediation) (Hayes, 2012), we conducted post hoc analyses
including IU (IUS-12) as the moderator when appropriate.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlational Analyses
Mean scores (SDs) obtained by participants (not transformed
scores) on all the study’s measures are reported in Table 1.
Correlations between all measures are reported in Table 2. As
shown, there were positive correlations between all measures
(small–medium range). Furthermore, the relations of age and
gender to all variables were assessed. Age was not correlated with
any of the study measures (all ps> 0.05), whereas gender (coding:
0 = male; 1 = female) was weakly related, in terms of effect size,
to the PSWQ (r = 0.20, p= 0.009).
Mediation Models
The first mediation analysis examined the indirect effects of IUS-
12 scores on PSWQ scores through WW-III, NPOQ, and R-CAQ,
controlling for DASS-21 Depression. Unstandardized regression
coefficients of the direct effects are reported in Figure 1.
The overall model was significant (F5,164 = 45.44, p < 0.001)
and explained 58.1% of the variance in PSWQ scores. The
TABLE 1 | Mean, standard deviations and Cronbach alphas observed in
the UK undergraduate sample in all study measures.
M SD Cronbach alpha
IUS-12 30.38 10.47 0.93
WW-III 91.36 22.97 0.94
NPOQ 30.99 12.50 0.96
R-CAQ 85.77 3.66 0.94
PSWQ 52.49 14.94 0.78
DASS-21 Anxiety 3.89 4.04 0.85
DASS-21 Depression 4.66 4.25 0.89
IUS-12, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12; WW-III, Why Worry-III; NPOQ,
Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire; R-CAQ, Revised-Cognitive Avoidance
Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; DASS-21 Anxiety,
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale–Anxiety subscale; DASS-21 Depression,
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale–Depression subscale.
total effect of IUS-12 scores on PSWQ scores was significant
(b= 0.8836, SE = 0.0887, t = 9.97, p < 0.001, 99% CIs= 0.6526,
1.1146). The covariate DASS-21 Depression was not significant
(p = 0.42). Specific and total indirect effects are shown in
Table 3. The indirect effect of IUS-12 on PSWQ through
NPOQ was significant. Post hoc moderated mediation analyses
were then performed. The IUS-12 × NPOQ interaction, i.e.,
the conditional indirect effect (Figure 2) was not significant
(b = −0.0053, SE = 0.0065, t = −0.81, p = 0.42, 99%
CIs=−0.0223, 0.0117). The second mediation analysis examined
the indirect effects of IUS-12 scores on DASS-21 Anxiety scores
through WW-III, NPOQ, and R-CAQ, controlling for DASS-
21 Depression. Unstandardized regression coefficients of the
direct effects are reported in Figure 3. The overall model was
significant (F5,164 = 25.26, p < 0.001), and explained 43.5%
of the variance in DASS-21 Anxiety scores. The total effect of
IUS-12 scores on DASS-21 Anxiety was significant (b = 0.0104,
SE = 0.0023, t = 4.57, p < 0.001, 99% CIs = 0.0045, 0.0164),
and the covariate DASS-21 Depression resulted significant
(p < 0.001). Specific and total indirect effects are shown in
Table 3. None of the indirect effects was significant. In light
of results, post hoc moderated mediation analyses were not
conducted.
Discussion
Results from the first mediation model suggest that only NPO
has a mediational role in the path from IU and worry in UK
undergraduates. This finding provides only partial support to
the original hypotheses, since neither PBW nor CA emerged to
mediate the relationship between IU and worry. Furthermore,
results from the second mediation model highlighted that the
path from IU to somatic anxiety was not mediated by any of
the three hypothesized mediators. Despite not confirming our
hypotheses, such a result could be reasonable considering that
the Laval model of GAD aimed to conceptualized PBW, NPO,
and CA as specifically related to worry severity than to somatic
anxiety symptom severity. Lastly, IU did not emerge to influence
the mediational path to worry through NPO, thus it was not a
moderator.
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TABLE 2 | Correlations (Pearson rs) between the scores on all measures observed in the UK undergraduate sample.
WW-III NPOQ R-CAQ PSWQ DASS-21 Anxiety DASS-21 Depression
IUS-12 0.19∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.50∗∗
WW-III 0.20∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.23∗∗
NPOQ 0.49∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.58∗∗
R-CAQ 0.36∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.40∗∗
PSWQ 0.49∗∗ 0.48∗∗
DASS-21 Anxiety 0.59∗∗
IUS-12, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12; WW-III, Why Worry-III; NPOQ, Negative Problem orientation Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; DASS-
21 Anxiety, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale–Anxiety subscale; DASS-21 Depression, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale–Depression subscale. ∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Unstandardized regression coefficients between IU,
mediators, and worry in the UK undergraduate sample. ∗∗p < 0.001.
STUDY 2
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
Four hundred and eighty-eight Italian undergraduate students
(61.7% females), aged between 19 and 27 years (M = 21.17,
SD = 1.54), voluntarily entered the study. All of them were
Caucasian. Participants were all attending their 2nd year of
university studies at the Schools of Psychology and Engineering
of the University of Padova (Italy). They all provided their
written informed consent before completing the study measures;
no incentives were offered for participation. Participants filled
in a socio-demographic schedule and then questionnaires were
administered in counterbalanced order to control for order
effects. The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of
the Psychological Sciences, University of Padova.
Measures
The Italian translations of the above-described (please refer
to Study 1) IUS-12, WW-III, NPOQ, and R-CAQ were
administered. Since no validated version of those instruments
was available at the time the study was conducted, the
standard forward-back translation procedure was performed
(e.g., Brislin, 1986). Three independent researchers translated
the questionnaires from English to Italian and then reached
agreement on a common version for each measure. Idiomatic
Italian at the 6th-grade level was used for this step. Moreover,
the researchers reviewed the common version to ensure there
were no colloquialisms, slang, or esoteric phrases that would
make interpretations difficult. The shared forms were then back-
translated by a bilingual individual with extensive knowledge
of psychological research. The back-translations proved to be
nearly identical to the original ones. As a final step, 5 experts
in anxiety disorders rated the items of all the newly developed
Italian versions. Each expert rated the items on a 5-point scale
(1= not at all, 5= extremely) for clarity (the extent to which the
item is clearly described). The experts’ ratings indicated excellent
clarity, indicating that further item refinement was unnecessary.
Notably, preliminary evidence of good psychometric properties
of the Italian translations of these measures was provided (Bottesi
et al., 2014). Moreover, a preliminary validation of the Italian
TABLE 3 | Specific and total indirect effects of IU on worry and somatic anxiety through PBW, NPO, and CA controlling depression in the UK
undergraduate sample.
Bootstrapped 99% CIs
Dependent variable Mediators Point estimate SE Lower Upper
PSWQ WW-III 0.0029 0.0112 −0.0196 0.0626
NPOQ 0.3152 0.0810 0.1220 0.5729
R-CAQ −0.0208 0.0339 −0.1252 0.0702
Total 0.2972 0.0810 0.1138 0.5287
DASS-21-Anxiety WW-III 0.0000 0.0002 −0.0005 0.0011
NPOQ 0.0019 0.0018 −0.0027 0.0068
R-CAQ 0.0010 0.0010 −0.0016 0.0041
Total 0.0029 0.0021 −0.0020 0.0089
WW-III, Why Worry-III; NPOQ, Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire; R-CAQ, Revised-Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire;
DASS-21 Anxiety, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale–Anxiety subscale.
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FIGURE 2 | Conditional indirect effect of IU on worry through NPO in
the UK undergraduate sample.
FIGURE 3 | Unstandardized regression coefficients between IU,
mediators, and somatic anxiety in the UK undergraduate sample.
∗∗p < 0.001.
IUS-12 on a sample of university students showed that it
possesses good internal consistency, construct and discriminant
validities, and gender invariance (Bottesi et al., 2015b). In the
present study, all the measures showed acceptable (α > 0.60;
Theorell et al., 1993) to excellent (α > 0.90) internal consistency
values (please see Table 4).
Furthermore, the validated Italian version of the PSWQ
(Morani et al., 1999) was administered. In the current sample,
internal consistency was acceptable (α= 0.68).
Lastly, instead of the DASS-21, the Beck Anxiety Inventory
(Beck et al., 1988; Italian version by Sica et al., 2006) and the
Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck et al., 1996; Italian version
by Ghisi et al., 2006) were employed to measure somatic anxiety
and depressive symptoms, respectively.
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988; Italian
version by Sica et al., 2006) is a 21-item self-report questionnaire
measuring the severity of anxiety over the previous week.
Participants are required to answer on a 4 point-Likert scale
ranging from 0= “not at all” to 3= “severely-I could barely stand
it).” The BAI possesses excellent internal consistency and good 1-
week test–retest reliability (Beck et al., 1988). The Italian version
of the BAI demonstrated good internal consistency and 30-day
test–retest reliability (Sica et al., 2006; Sica and Ghisi, 2007);
internal consistency was excellent in the study sample (α= 0.90).
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996;
Italian version by Ghisi et al., 2006) is a 21-item self-report
questionnaire assessing the severity of affective, cognitive,
motivational, vegetative, and psychomotor components of
depression. Each BDI-II item is rated on a 4-point scale ranging
from 0 to 3 and the instructions ask the respondent to endorse,
for each item, the most characteristic statement, covering the
time frame of “the past 2 weeks, including today.” The BDI-II
showed high internal consistency and good 1-week test–retest
reliability among college students (Beck et al., 1996). The Italian
version evidenced excellent psychometric properties as well (Sica
and Ghisi, 2007), and the Cronbach alpha value observed in the
present sample was α= 0.90.
Statistical Analyses
The same procedure and data analytic strategy described in
Study 1 were applied in Study 2. Also in Study 2 several
variables, namely NPOQ, R-CAQ, BAI, and BDI-II evidenced
significant skewness and were subsequently transformed to a
normal distribution by applying a log10 transformation.
Furthermore, similar to Study 1, the employed depression
measure (BDI-II) showed positive correlations with all the other
variables (please refer to Table 5) and was therefore included as a
covariate into the two mediation models.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlational Analyses
Means (SDs) and Cronbach alphas obtained on all the study
measures (not transformed scores) are displayed in Table 4.
Table 5 shows correlations between questionnaires within the
Italian sample. Results highlighted positive correlations between
all measures (small–medium range). Furthermore, age emerged
TABLE 4 | Mean, standard deviations and Cronbach alphas observed in
the Italian undergraduate sample in all study measures.
M SD Cronbach’s alpha
IUS-12 24.63 6.44 0.81
WW-III 93.39 25.21 0.94
NPOQ 24.50 8.93 0.92
R-CAQ 71.61 18.78 0.93
PSWQ 43.83 11.27 0.68
BAI 9.15 8.48 0.90
BDI-II 9.65 8.23 0.90
IUS-12, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12; WW-III, Why Worry-III; NPOQ,
Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire; R-CAQ, Revised-Cognitive Avoidance
Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BAI, Beck Anxiety
Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory–Second Edition.
TABLE 5 | Correlations (Pearson rs) between the scores on all measures
observed in the Italian undergraduate sample.
WW-III NPOQ R-CAQ PSWQ BAI BDI-II
IUS-12 0.34∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.41∗∗
WW-III 0.25∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.23∗∗
NPOQ 0.43∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.58∗∗
R-CAQ 0.35∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.42∗∗
PSWQ 0.53∗∗ 0.49∗∗
BAI 0.57∗∗
IUS-12, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12; WW-III, Why Worry-III; NPOQ,
Negative Problem orientation Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry
Questionnaire; BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory–
Second Edition. ∗∗p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 4 | Unstandardized regression coefficients between IU,
mediators, and worry in the Italian undergraduate sample. ∗∗p < 0.001.
to be weakly negatively related only with the BAI (r = −0.14,
p = 0.002), and gender was weakly related, in terms of effect
size, to the PSWQ (r = 0.16, p < 0.001) and the BAI (r = 0.18,
p < 0.001). Age and gender were not associated with scores
obtained in the other study measures (all ps > 0.05).
Mediation Models
The first mediation analysis examined the indirect effects of IUS-
12 scores on PSWQ scores through WW-III, NPOQ, and R-CAQ
scores, controlling for BDI-II scores. Unstandardized regression
coefficients of the direct effects are reported in Figure 4. The
overall model was significant (F5,482 = 74.88, p < 0.001) and
explained 43.7% of the variance in PSWQ scores. The total effect
of IUS-12 scores on PSWQ scores was significant (b = 0.64,
SE = 0.07, t = 9.20, p < 0.001, 99% CIs = 0.4596, 0.8190). The
covariate BDI-II also resulted significant (p < 0.001). Specific
and total indirect effects are shown in Table 6. The indirect
effects of IUS-12 to PSWQ through WW-III and NPOQ were
significant. Post hoc moderated mediation analyses were then
performed. Findings highlighted that the IUS-12 × NPOQ
interaction, i.e., the conditional indirect effect, was slightly
significant and positive (b = 0.90, SE = 0.47, t = 1.92, p = 0.049,
99% CIs = 0.3107, 2.1192), thus suggesting that the path is
moderated by IUS-12 scores. A visual inspection of results
emerged from the bootstrapped tests (Figure 5) shows that the
indirect effect of NPOQ scores was increasing with IUS-12 scores
over almost all of IUS-12 scores range. On the contrary, the
IUS-12 × WW-III interaction (Figure 6) emerged not to be
significant (b = −0.0005, SE = 0.0026, t = −0.18, p = 0.86, 99%
CIs=−0.0072, 0.0062).
The second mediation analysis examined the indirect effects
of IUS-12 scores on BAI through WW-III, NPOQ, and R-CAQ
scores controlling for BDI-II scores. Unstandardized regression
coefficients of the direct effects are reported in Figure 7. The
overall model was significant (F5,482 = 61.93, p < 0.001) and
explained 39.1% of the variance in BAI. The total effect of IUS-
12 scores on BAI scores was significant (b= 0.0119, SE= 0.0023,
t = 5.14, p < 0.001, 99% CIs = 0.0059, 0.0179). The covariate
BDI-II resulted significant (p < 0.001). Specific and total indirect
effects are shown in Table 6. The indirect path of IUS-12 on
BAI through R-CAQ was significant. Also in this case, post hoc
moderated mediation analyses were conducted. The IUS-12× R-
CAQ interaction, i.e., the conditional indirect effect (Figure 8),
was not significant (b = 0.0090, SE = 0.0215, t = 0.42, p = 0.68,
99% CIs=−0.0466, 0.0646).
Discussion
Findings emerged from the two mediation models were partially
in line with our hypotheses. First, both PBW and NPO, but not
CA, were significant mediators in the path from IU and worry;
second, only CA (but not NPO) played a mediational role in the
path from IU and somatic anxiety. Lastly, IU moderated only the
association between NPO and worry: The higher were IU levels,
the larger was the mediational effect of NPO.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The IUM for GAD identified four main components associated
with the development and maintenance of worry: IU, PBW,
NPO, and CA (Dugas et al., 1998). Among them, IU was
conceptualized as a background factor and the literature of the
last 20 years supports the notion of IU as a vulnerability factor
for worry (Dugas et al., 1998; Ladouceur et al., 2000; Sexton
et al., 2003; Koerner and Dugas, 2008). Despite studies showing
the contributions of PBW, NPO, and CA and occasionally in
a mediational path from IU to worry (e.g., Dugas et al., 2007;
Koerner and Dugas, 2008), whether and how these components
can turn IU into worry and somatic anxiety still remains to
be clarified. Therefore, the current studies aimed at gathering
a better understanding of the original Laval model by testing
two mediation models using bootstrapping approaches in two
university samples made up of UK and Italian undergraduate
students.
Our first hypothesis stated that PBW would have mediated
the relationship between IU and worry but not the relationship
between IU and somatic anxiety. As far as concern the path to
worry, such an expectation was only partially sustained: Indeed,
PBW emerged as a mediator only in the Italian sample. The
different mediational patterns observed across samples is no
better explained by a different degree of reliance in such beliefs
across samples, since groups scored similarly on the WW-III
(F1,657 = 0.85, p = 0.36). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that
PBW have been proposed to initially drive the worry process,
thus fostering the initial use of worry as a coping strategy
and, once established across time, their role is variable (Dugas
et al., 2007). Consequently, in light of the higher levels of
both IU (F1,657 = 70.61; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.10) and worry
(F1,657 = 62.20, p =< 0.001; η2p = 0.09) demonstrated by the
UK students when compared with the Italian ones, one could
hypothesize that a greater establishment of worry – altogether
with a minor endorsement of PBW – might have already occurred
in the former and, therefore, PBW could have already played
their function. As regards the path from IU to somatic anxiety,
consistently with our hypotheses, PBW emerged not to play
a mediational role in both cultures; this confirms that, given
their content specificity, PBW are logically associated with worry
(Freeston et al., 1994).
The second hypothesis of the current study was that NPO and
CA would have been mediators in the paths from IU to both
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TABLE 6 | Specific and total indirect effects of IU on worry and somatic anxiety through PBW, NPO, and CA controlling depression in the Italian
undergraduate sample.
Bootstrapped 99% CIs
Dependent variable Mediators Point estimate SE Lower Upper
PSWQ WW-III 0.0989 0.0462 0.1888 0.4313
NPOQ 0.1909 0.0377 0.0990 0.2958
R-CAQ 0.0077 0.0157 −0.0298 0.0555
Total 0.2975 0.0462 0.1888 0.4313
BAI WW-III 0.0005 0.0007 −0.0013 0.0024
NPOQ 0.0019 0.0012 −0.0011 0.0051
R-CAQ 0.0022 0.0007 0.0007 0.0045
Total 0.0046 0.0015 0.0009 0.0086
WW-III, Why Worry-III; NPOQ, Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire; R-CAQ, Revised-Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire;
BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory.
FIGURE 5 | Conditional indirect effect of IU on worry through NPO in
the Italian undergraduate sample.
worry and somatic anxiety. As far as concern NPO, it emerged
to play a mediational role in the path from IU to worry both
in Studies 1 and 2 thus demonstrating its involvement across
cultures. On the other hand, NPO did not emerge to play any
mediational role in the path from IU to somatic anxiety, which
is in contrast with previous evidence highlighting this cognitive
variable to be relevant also to somatic anxiety (e.g., Dugas et al.,
2007; Fergus and Wu, 2011). Nonetheless, as outlined in other
studies, NPO (as well as PBW and CA) are theorized to contribute
directly to worry, which is then posited to contribute to somatic
anxiety symptoms (e.g., Dugas and Robichaud, 2007; Dugas et al.,
2007). In light of this, our result is barely surprising. An opposite
pattern of results emerged when analyzing the role of CA. Indeed,
findings revealed that it mediated only the path from IU to
somatic anxiety and only in the Italian sample. Its involvement
in the association between IU and somatic anxiety provides
further support to the evidence stating that CA strategies are
relevant in affecting peripheral activation and somatic symptoms
(e.g., Borkovec et al., 2004), even though understanding why
this emerged only in the Italian student sample is struggling.
Notably, also in this case it is to note that UK undergraduates
showed higher levels of CA than Italian ones (F1,657 = 62.29;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.09), therefore hypothesizing such a finding as
a function of a differential endorsement of CA strategies across
samples is not explanatory. Furthermore, since the two samples
were administered different measures of anxiety symptoms (i.e.,
FIGURE 6 | Conditional indirect effect of IU on worry through PBW in
the Italian undergraduate sample.
FIGURE 7 | Unstandardized regression coefficients between IU,
mediators, and somatic anxiety in the Italian undergraduate sample.
∗∗p < 0.001.
the DASS-21 Anxiety in the UK sample and the BAI in the Italian
one), speculating about differences between samples in relation
to somatic anxiety levels is not possible. As already mentioned,
CA emerged not to mediate the path from IU to worry in both
samples. This is quite an unexpected finding, considering that
CA is considered an important maintenance factor of worry
(Borkovec et al., 1993, 2004; Dugas et al., 1998), and raises
questions about the involvement of this component into the
model.
Post hoc moderated mediation analyses were performed,
when appropriate, to test whether IU levels moderated the
mediational effect of the other components in the paths to
worry and somatic anxiety. Findings revealed that IU emerged
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1723
fpsyg-07-01723 October 28, 2016 Time: 12:48 # 10
Bottesi et al. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Model of Gad Revised
FIGURE 8 | Conditional indirect effect of IU on somatic anxiety through
CA in the Italian undergraduate sample.
as a moderator only in the path to worry through NPO, and
only in Italian students, thus providing only partial support
to the idea of IU as a moderator of this relationship. Such
a difference could be cautionary explained in terms of cross-
cultural issues. Indeed, whilst UK has been reported as a culture
whose members are more prone to take and manage unknown
risks, Italy is included among the “strong uncertainty avoidance
cultures” (De Mooij, 2000, 2003; Stremersch and Tellis, 2004;
Wennekers et al., 2007). Notably, economic and financial crises
have troubled Italy in the last decade; this might have somewhat
impacted on a population (and on its young adult portion in
particular) supposed to be resistant to change and particularly
conservative. Notably, this does not necessarily mean that Italian
university students are more intolerant of uncertainty than their
UK counterparts; rather, they are likely to attribute a different
(and more negative) meaning to uncertainty and/or to be less
used to it (as demonstrated by scores obtained on the IUS-12,
where scores shown by the Italian undergraduates were even
significantly lower than those obtained by UK undergraduates).
Nonetheless we acknowledge that, overall, our findings failed
to demonstrate that the contribution of PBW, NPO, and CA
depends on the level of IU, thus not providing additional help
in understanding why higher IU leads to higher levels of worry
(e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2000; Koerner and Dugas, 2008).
To summarize, the current re-examination of the IUM for
GAD showed that the original conceptualization of the model,
claiming that IU contributes to worry and anxiety through
PBW, NPO, and CA is substantially supported but only in the
Italian undergraduate sample, whereas findings emerged from
the UK one are controversial. The discrepancies characterizing
main results obtained in the two samples further strengthen
the recommendation of performing cross-cultural studies in the
field of anxiety, since it looks like that people from different
cultures might actually interpret and express their symptoms
in a different way, and cross-cultural research should help in
understanding why and how (Malgady, 1996; Kirmayer, 2001;
Norton, 2005). For example, related to this and with specific
regard to IU, Norton (2005) explored the psychometric properties
and the structure factor of the IUS in four different racial groups
(African, Caucasian, Hispanic, and Southeast Asian) and findings
showed that, despite substantially similar reliability and validity
values across the four racial groups emerged, differences in the
factor structures across groups were found; the extent to which
cultural or racial variables had influenced results was not clearly
definable but could not be excluded. A number of issues might
have contributed in determining different patterns across samples
and should be acknowledged as weaknesses characterizing the
present research. First, the UK undergraduate sample was mainly
made up of female participants (86.5%), whereas the Italian one
was only slightly unbalanced in regard to gender (61.7% females).
Such a disproportion in terms of gender composition may have
affected results, since evidence highlighting that women are more
likely to refer fear and higher levels of physiological hyperarousal,
catastrophic cognitions, and anxiety sensitivity than men have
been reported in literature (e.g., Armstrong and Khawaja, 2002;
McLean and Anderson, 2011). On the other hand, in the present
study female gender emerged to be (weakly) associated with
higher scores on the PSWQ in both samples (and with scores
obtained on the BAI in the Italian sample), therefore the two
samples appear to be similarly characterized despite the number
of females included. Possibly related to this, UK students showed
higher levels of IU, NPO, CA, and worry than their Italian
counterparts. Such differences could be reasonably attributed to a
gender effect (but interactions Group × Gender for all measures
resulted p > 0.05); to a “subject effect,” since the Italian sample
was made up not only of Psychology students like the UK sample,
but also of Engineering students who can show both a different
approach and sensitivity to “psychology stuff”; to a culturally
different attitude to metacognition; to different mechanisms
intervening in different cultures. Indeed, emerged findings could
also suggest that UK students are more prone to worry than
Italian ones, but the processes through which they worry are
different. Future studies should further investigate these topics.
Another already mentioned difference between samples is in
terms of measures employed to assess somatic anxiety and
depression levels; this limits the possibility of tracing reliable
comparisons between the results emerged in the two samples.
Nonetheless, excellent convergent validity values between the
DASS-21, the BAI, and the BDI-II have been extensively reported
across cultures (Antony et al., 1998; Daza et al., 2002; Bados et al.,
2005; Bottesi et al., 2015a), thus suggesting that such instruments
substantially measure the same constructs. Furthermore, it is to
note that scores ranges observed in the two samples on these
measures were in line with previous literature on large non-
clinical samples (e.g., Henry and Crawford, 2005; Sica and Ghisi,
2007).
Several further limitations characterizing the present study
should be taken into account. The sample sizes employed,
despite not extremely small, do not allow to generalize emerged
results. A further obstacle to the generalization of results is
represented by the cross-sectional nature of the current data.
Indeed, we tested a conceptually (and partially empirically
demonstrated) plausible model, but many cross-sectional models
have equally plausible alternatives; furthermore, a number of
biases characterizing the tests of mediation when using cross-
sectional data have been highlighted (e.g., Maxwell and Cole,
2007). Therefore, longitudinal research in this field is highly
recommended. Moreover, given the nature of samples, studies
testing the same models also in community as well as in clinical
populations are advocated. Indeed, whilst the adequacy and
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the advantages of employing analog samples when conducting
research on clinical phenomena has been claimed (e.g., Ruscio
et al., 2001; Olatunji et al., 2010; Abramowitz et al., 2014), current
findings are not necessarily generalizable to other populations
and, therefore, need to be intended as a starting point for
additional research focusing on differently characterized samples.
Another shortcoming is represented by the fact that some
of the measures administered in the UK sample were not-
validated refinements of previous versions (i.e., the WW-III
and the R-CAQ), and some questionnaires used in the Italian
sample were translations – and not proper validations – of
the correspondent English ones (e.g., the IUS-12, the WW-III,
the NPOQ, and the R-CAQ); nevertheless, internal consistency
values were adequate both in the present study and in previous
researches (Bottesi et al., 2014, 2015b). An additional issue
deserving attention is the decision we made about partialling out
depression in the models we tested. The rationale for doing so was
eliminating a third variable scenario (depression) and increasing
the specificity of findings to worry and somatic anxiety; however,
in the current study measures of depression correlated with
measures of worry and somatic anxiety in the 0.48 to 0.59
range and partialling out depression certainly took out a lot
of variance. Therefore, such an issue raises questions about
what is the portion of worry/anxiety that does not overlap with
depression conceptually: Future developments should consider
controlling for anhedonia rather than for shared features. Related
to this, it is worthy to further highlight that increasing evidence
supporting the notion of IU as a transdiagnostic factor involved
in several psychopathologies beyond GAD, such as obsessive
compulsive disorder (e.g., Tolin et al., 2003; Holaway et al., 2006),
depression (e.g., Buhr and Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 2004; van
der Heiden et al., 2010), post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g.,
Banducci et al., 2016; Oglesby et al., 2016), panic disorder and
agoraphobia (e.g., McEvoy and Mahoney, 2012; Carleton et al.,
2013), and social anxiety (e.g., Riskind et al., 2007; Boelen and
Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton et al., 2010), has been documented.
Future studies aiming to achieve a more in-depth knowledge
of the commonalities that may exist between disorders are
recommended; moreover, investigating the functioning of high-
level factors, such as IU, in different phenomenologies might
increase our understanding of comorbidities (Gentes and Ruscio,
2011).
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned limits, overall present
results provide support to the current refinement of the original
Laval model, where the IUM components are better conceptually
integrated. Differential cross-cultural IU mechanisms, as well
as potentially different worry domains across cultures, might
have contributed to observed findings and deserve further
investigation. Clinically, the findings tentatively suggest that
understanding how people of different cultures understand and
express uncertainty and IU may be central in our ability to target
it effectively in therapy.
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